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ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
TREATIES: AN ANALYSIS
In Israel more than two thousand years ago, Isaiah cried out to his
people: "Woe unto them that join house to house, that lay field to
field, til there be no place, that they may be placed alone in the midst
of the Earth!"
In ancient Greece, Plato wrote: "There are mountains in Attica which
can now keep nothing but bees, but which were clothed, not so very
long ago, with . timber suitable for roofing the very large build-
ings. . 'The annual supply of rainfall was not lost, as it is at present,
through being allowed to flow over the denuded surface to the sea."
And in early Rome, "Tertullian observed: All places are now accessi-
ble . cultivated fields have subdued forests; flocks and herds have
expelled wild beasts. . Everywhere are houses, and inhabitants,
and settled governments, and civilized life. What most frequently
meets the view is our teeming population; our numbers are burden-
some to the world .. our wants grow more and more keen, and our
complaints bitter in all mouths, whilst nature fails in affording us her
usual sustenance. In every deed, pestilence, and famine, and wars,
and earthquakes have to be regarded for nations, as means for prun-
ing the luxuriance of the human race."
Douglas P Wheeler*
INTRODUCTION
The subject of environmental degradation has erupted into the in-
ternational political forefront. Concern for the future of the planet
has now become global, due in part to advancements m telecommuni-
cations and further advancements in our understanding of the bio-
sphere.' Recent events have demanded that industrialized nations
take the lead and develop not only the scientific means to address
environmental issues, but also the political, social, and legal means to
prevent future disasters. In the past few years the world has witnessed
numerous accidental and intentional occurrences of severe environ-
mental impairment - the Exxon Valdez spill, which deposited mil-
lions of gallons of oil into the environmentally vulnerable Valdez
straits of Alaska; Saddain Hussein's Mideastern assault, which turned
the Kuwaiti oil fields into a charred wasteland, and most recently, the
Greek Ship Aegean Sea's spill, which left enough oil off the northwest-
* Forward to Wilderness 1987 Sierra Club Engagement Calendar (Sierra Club &
Random House 1986).
1. Damel B. Magraw, Global Change and International Law, 1 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 1-2 (1990).
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ern coast of Spain to cover ten square miles of ocean - all provide
vivid examples.2
Previously, these problems were considered to be strictly within the
domain of individual nations. It is apparent that they now require in-
ternational cooperation and solutions. Without international coopera-
tion and disclosure of such problems, the results can be catastrophic.
We need look no further than the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl to see
such results. Problems such as the depletion of the ozone layer, cli-
mactic changes, acid rain, hazardous waste, and the greenhouse effect
demand international attention and international solutions.
The international community's interest in environmental problems
is evident in four different situations.3 The first three relate to human
activities within a particular country that cause harm to (1) global
commons - e.g., the ozone layer, (2) another state - e.g., trans-
boundary pollution, or (3) international interests - e.g., the threat of
extinction of a particular species.4 The fourth situation results from
natural events such as volcanic eruptions and earthquakes.5 As these
concerns grow, so does the international response. There is a flurry of
international environmental lawmaking efforts already underway. If
these laws are to be successful, however, enforcement mechanisms
must be established.
This Note examines the mechanisms currently existing to enforce
international environmental treaties. Part I discusses the role of vari-
ous international bodies, particularly that of the United Nations and
individual states with respect to laws pertaining to the global environ-
ment. Part II illustrates the various problems and inadequacies of the
current international legal framework. Part III introduces a proposal
for a central, international environmental authority while emphasizing
the preservation of autonomous organizations. The Conclusion ar-
gues that the decision-making process for enforcement must be repre-
sentative of the global community if it is to ascend to legitimacy and
generate power to enforce treaties and decisions. This Note concludes
that the prevention of global environmental disasters and resolution
of environmental issues must involve cooperation of all states if they
are to be successful.
I. THE ROLE OF IERNATIONAL BODIES IN ENFORCEMENT
There is a plethora of international environmental organizations
which attempt to analyze and resolve environmental issues. However,
none of these organizations have enforcement power. The interna-
tional environmental infrastructure began to manifest itself in the
2. Fire Ends on Oil Tanker Wrecked off Spain, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1992, at A3.
3. Magraw, supra note 1, at 3-4.
4. Id. at 3-4.
5. Id. at 4.
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form of the Umted Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), estab-
lished by the Umted Nations General Assembly m 1972.6 UNEP's
purpose is to promote cooperation and coordination among nations,
to recommend environmental policies and to provide general policy
guidelines in the international environmental arena for all nations.
The UNEP Secretariat is the focal point for environmental action and
coordination within the United Nations system. 7 The Governing
Council of UNEP, the Secretariat, which is headed by the executive
director, and the Environmental Fund are all located in Nairobi,
Kenya, thereby making UNEP the first UN body to have its head-
quarters outside the developed world.8
UNEP is actively involved in the assessment and monitoring of the
global environment. Through a program called Earthwatch, informa-
tion exchange, research activities, momtormg of environmental issues
and a continual review and evaluation of the environment on a global
scale take place periodically in order to identify new problems.
UNEP's involvement has been critical in the arrangement of various
protocols, conventions and other agreements. It is a relatively small
UN body and is limited by personnel and financial constraints. UNEP
does not have the power that one of the more specialized agencies of
the United Nations has, such as the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (FAO), and therefore it has little influence on the environmental
policies pursued by other Umted Nations agencies. 9 In addition,
UNEP, financed solely by voluntary contributions to the Environmen-
tal Fund, is inadequately funded.' 0 UNEP's major linutation is its lack
of implementation and enforcement powers at the national level. Un-
fortunately, it must rely on the member states to implement and com-
ply with its endeavors.
Other organizations concerned with the environment and enforce-
ment of environmental treaties include: International Law Associa-
tion (ILA), the International Umon for Conservation of Nature and
Natural Resources (IUCN), the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF),
the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and Greenpeace, all
of which are Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). As the
network of NGOs continues to develop, its effects will become in-
creasingly far-reaching and powerful. Until recently, international en-
vironmental law was essentially an acadenuc field with few practical
applications. Now, however, the provisions in international agree-
6. HAROLD K. JACOBSON & DAVID A. KAY, A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION II, (Alanheld, Os-
mun & Co. 1983).
7. Id.
8. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND REGULATION 1.O.-28 (1991).
9. Id.
10. W.M. ADAMS, GREEN DEVELOPMENT: ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY
IN THE THIRD WORLD (Routledge 1990).
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ments are being translated into national and local legislation." For
example, countries that are parties to the Montreal Protocol (dealing
with Chloroflourocarbons (CFCs) have enacted, or are m the process
of enacting, legislation which would restrict the use of CFCs. This
legislation will directly affect the local home appliance dealer who
sells refrigerators and air conditioners.'
Effective domestic laws within an international framework of regu-
lations would be the ideal situation in which to regulate and enforce
international environmental law. Infringement upon state sovereignty
is a major stumbling block in treaty negotiations and enforcement ef-
forts. Because the enforcement laws would be those of the sovereign
state, states could monitor their own compliance without harboring
the paranoia and stigma that come with international policing.
Self-compliance, at first glance, appears to be a prime target for
abuse. However, the various international NGOs act as very capable
policing agencies; moreover, these organizations are already in place
and operating.'3 Further, "this allows the individual states to control
their own resources without the 'interference' by other states trying to
'internationalize' the resources.' 14
A. United Nations and Enforcement
Unfortunately, UNEP does not have the ability to create binding
international law. Instead it merely studies, recommends, and adopts
non-binding resolutions and charters; this is done with the expectation
that member states will feel an obligation to abide by the provisions
and cooperate in safeguarding the environment on an international
scale. The United Nations continues to strive for environmental integ-
rity by issuing declarations with which nations may or may not com-
ply. For example, the Declaration of the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment reflects the need for "a common outlook
and common principles to inspire and guide" all people to preserve
the human environment.'" The Declaration states that "the protec-
11. See supra note 8, at 1.0.4.
12. Id.
13. Administrative structures, whether national or international, tend to integrate
ecological requirements into general national or international policies. The main task
of organs in charge of the protection of the environment is often to coordinate activi-
ties of other agencies, thus introducing ecological considerations into those activities.
Tis is what occurs in numerous ministries and agencies at the national level. Simi-
larly, this is also the case with the United Nations Environmental Programme, one of
the principal attributes of which is to coordinate the activities of all United Nations
specialized agencies and regional organizations in this field.
14. Roseann Eshbach, Comment, A Global Approach to the Protection of the En-
vironment" Balancing State Sovereignty and Global Interests, 4 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 271, 288 (1990).
15. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stock-
holm, June 5-16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 48/14/Rev. 1, U.N. Sales No. E.73.II.A.14.
(1972) [hereinafter Report on the Human Environment].
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tion and improvement of the human environment is... the urgent
desire of the peoples of the whole world and the duty of all
governments."' 6
Of course, the United Nations cannot bear sole responsibility for
managing world-wide environmental protection efforts. However, it
should and does play an important role as a facilitator and coordinator
of efforts and information.' 7 The United Nations provides an existing
infrastructure for international enforcement which has achieved some
success through nations' cooperative efforts.' This infrastructure
may provide a more effective means of compliance and enforcement
of environmental laws than the traditional law enforcement method of
prescription and punishment. 9
The United Nations has facilitated greater cooperation in the inter-
national commuity m various environmental problem areas. In-
cluded in this effort is the landmark climate treaty signed m Rio de
Janeiro on June 12, 1992, limiting the emission of "greenhouse" gases
in order to stabilize output of such gases to 1990 levels by the year
2000.20 Further, a General Assembly Resolution written in 1989
called for greater international cooperation in monitoring, assessing
and anticipating environmental threats and rendering assistance in
cases of environmental disasters.2'
B. International Law and Lack of Liability
The primary sources of international law are international agree-
ments, custom and general principles of law. A shortcoming of inter-
national agreements is that only signatories are legally bound. In the
absence of an explicit agreement concerning a particular matter, one
must look to customary rules and general principles of international
law for possible solutions. These sources of law are often vague and
16. Id.
17. Catherine Tinker, Note, Environmental Planet Management by the United Na-
tions: An Idea Whose Tune Has Not Yet Come?, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 793,796
(1990).
The lack of enforcement power by the U[nited] N[ations] is well known and
is often used by skeptics to criticize not only the U[nited] N[ations], but pub-
lic international law in general. Although the U[nited] N[ations] cannot or-
der or control member states, it does wield significant power by using
diplomatic pressure and public opinion to induce compliance from states
seeking legitimacy in the international arena. This "culture of compliance"
is extremely significant in that it results in states conforming their behavior
even when it may be contrary to their short-term interests.
Id.
18. Id. at 808.
19. Id.
20. William K. Stevens, With Climate Treaty Signed, All Say They'll Do Even
More, N.Y. TiMns, June 13, 1992, at Al.
21. International Co-operation in Monitoring, Assessment and Anticipation of En-
vironmental Threats and in Assistance in Cases of Environmental Emergency, G.A.
Res. 44/224, U.N. Doc. A/44/746/Add.7 at 3 para. 1 (1989).
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almost always controversial. It is also difficult to obtain a consensus
concerning customary norms. Many of the customary norms created
by the industrialized capitalist countries are challenged by the devel-
oping countries. In such cases it is difficult to prove the existence of
binding legal rules. When accused of violating a customary norm, a
state may claim that no such norm exists or that it never accepted the
norm and therefore is not bound by it.12 For example, the former So-
viet Union demes liability for damages to other states caused by the
Chernobyl accident. Although attempts have been made to apply cus-
tomary rules and general principles of international law, the results
have been stagnation and indetermination.
There is a general consensus that a state is prohibited from allowing
public or private activities to cause significant pollution within another
state or in a "global commons."' Drawing upon international custom
as the primary source of law, publicists have sought to develop an in-
ternational liability scheme both to regulate transboundary pollu-
tion, 4 and to codify rules of customary international law in order to
clarify the legal duty upon states to prevent serious transnational envi-
ronmental harm. 5
C. Problems with United Nations Enforcement
The United Nations General Assembly is not a true legislative
body. Its resolutions have neither legal nor substantive binding
22. Richard E. Levy, International Law and the Chernobyl Accident: Reflections
on an Important but Imperfect System, 36 KAN. L. REv 81, 88 (1987).
23. Magraw, supra note 1, at 7 See Developments in the Law - International
Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L. REv 1484, 1492 (1991) [hereinafter Developments
in the Law] ("Under classical principles of international law, the obligation to prevent
transnational pollution falls solely upon the state.") Id.
24. Developments in the Law, supra note 23 (quoting Stephen C. McCaffrey, The
Work of the International Law Commission Relating to Transfrontier Environmental
Harm, 20 N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & POL. 715 (1988)).
25. Developments in the Law, supra note 23, at 1492.
Efforts to develop an effective international liability scheme have failed
utterly. Publicists have presupposed that extrapolations from rules of cus-
tomary international law coincide with shared interests of the individual
states upon whose participation a liability regime depends. Yet a regime
constructed from custom obscures - without resolving - the differences be-
tween the conflicting values states assign to environmental protection. The
codification of general customary duties founders upon this quandary of le-
gitimacy: as these duties are furnished with more determinate content, they
become more controversial, and as a result, many states refuse to bind them-
selves to the commands of the regime. Without codification, however, the
vague customary duties communicate no normative expectations or specific
commands, and states can claim that almost any conduct comports with in-
ternational law. The codification of standards of care thus falters over the
tradeoffs between infusing determinate but inevitably controversial content
into general norms and ensuring broad international consensus through
vague generality.
Id. at 1492-93.
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power. The United Nations' chief enforcement mechanism is the In-
ternational Court of Justice (ICJ).26 No executive authonty exists,
however, to enforce its decisions. Efforts to improve the effectiveness
of ICJ rulings in the environmental area include calling for a separate
environmental jurisdiction for the court.2 7 For example, when faced
with a labor dispute, the entire court does not hear the case. Rather,
several members of the Court have developed specialties in technical
and scientific matters to be adjudicated and are designated to sit in
specific chambers.2
D. Inadequacies of the Current Framework
Many organizations now question whether the current system for
handling international environmental disasters is adequate to meet to-
day's numerous environmental problems such as ozone depletion,
global warming, hazardous waste, deforestation and species elimma-
tion. The current framework remains essentially unchanged since the
1972 Umted Nations Conference on the Human Environment in
Stockholm; this was the first time the international community came
together to discuss a plan to deal with environmental contingencies.2 9
The question of establishing an institutional structure for enforcement
was not addressed in Stockholm, however.30 Furthermore, the inter-
national mechanisms born out of the Stockholm Conference appear to
many as an "unfamiliar network of haphazardly coordinated [agen-
cies] . . . a fantasm, with mirage-like powers, a creaking and frag-
mented process for deciding policy, and a surfeit of bureaucratic
fiefdoms that consistently muster inadequate resources to meet even
the most urgent challenges. ' 31
For the most part, nations have identified and recognized environ-
mental problems as those that concern security, quality of life and
even life itself. On the basis of such a revelation, it is equally agreed
that international coordination and cooperation is the best, if not the
only means by which to achieve the objective of international environ-
mental enforcement while maintaining environmental harmony.
26. 1947 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. Ch. II, Arts. 34-38.
27. Tinker, supra note 17, at 806.
28. Id. "In environmental cases, the same procedure could be used: under Article
26(1), environmental chambers could be constituted by agreement of the parties. Fi-
nally, chambers may be constituted by agreement of the parties to an individual dis-
pute who so request pursuant to Article 26(3)." Id. (citing remarks by Judge Jose
Ruda, President of the International Court of Justice, Award Presentation at N.Y.U.
School of Law, (September, 1989)).
29. See Report on the Human Environment, supra note 15.
30. A. Feraru, Environmental Actors, ENVIRONMENT AND THE GLOBAL ARENA
43, 50 (K. Dahlberg et al. eds., 1985).
31. UNrrED NATIONS ASS'N OF THE U.S.A., INc., UNITING NATIONS FOR THE
EARTH 33 (1990).
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A significant development in international environmental law oc-
curred as a result of the Trail Smelter arbitration in which the Interna-
tional Tribunal (established under the provisions of the 1909
Boundary Waters Treaty between the Umted States and Canada) was
asked to determine the damages to the United States caused by the
fumes from a privately owned Canadian smelter.32 The tribunal ex-
plicitly recognized state responsibility for activities that cause signifi-
cant injuries in or to the territory of another state.3 Similarly, in the
Corfu Channel case, where the United Kingdom sought to recover for
damages to British warships caused by Albanian mines, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice recognized "every State's obligation not to al-
low knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of
other States . . . [as a] general and well-recognized principle."34
While progress is evident, creating more effective enforcement meas-
ures requires expediency before further environmental impairment
occurs.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW MAKING AND STANDARD SETTING
The predominant sources of the law governing creation of interna-
tional agreements are the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties35 and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between
States and International Organizations or Between International Or-
ganizations.3 6 The first applies to agreements between states,37 and
the second applies to agreements involving international organiza-
tions;38 however, they are virtually identical in substantive law. Under
both conventions, states and international organizations have the ca-
pacity to enter binding agreements but they cannot be bound by any
agreement without their consent.39 Once negotiations and the basic
text of the agreement are completed, the Vienna Conventions do not
stipulate any particular ratification process nor do they require any
action to comply with the agreement during the ratification process.
It is true that each state that signs an agreement has an obligation to
"refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the
[agreement]" until it enters force;40 however, the details of this obliga-
tion remain vague.41 Given these bureaucratic "dream" provisions it
32. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905,1965 (1938,1941).
33. Id.
34. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Judgment of April 9).
35. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
341, 8 I.L.M. 679.
36. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.129/15 (1986).
37. Report on the Human Environment, supra note 15, at 333.
38. Tinker, supra note 17, at 805.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) oF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 311-39 (1987).
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may take years before an agreement is ratified by constituent states.
Thus, the delay pending ratification of a treaty in the case of environ-
mental agreements may render the agreement useless if the underly-
ing environmental situation worsens or becomes irreversible.42
The so called "soft" law, law that is promulgated without binding
force in the environmental arena, consists of periodic enforcement by
the General Assembly of the United Nations of the priorities set by
the UNEP.43 However, a recent session of the General Assembly
passed five substantive resolutions on environmental matters.44
"Hard" law is codified in treaty obligations, binding on parties to the
treaty, and sometimes binding on third parties.4' Treaty law on the
environment has developed extensively in the past twenty years.46
One hundred and forty multilateral treaties and protocols on the envi-
ronment are listed in UNEP's latest compilation, compared with the
fifty-eight listed m May, 1977.41 This trend, coupled with a detailed
provision to ensure restraint from "acts which would defeat the object
and purpose of the treaties" until such tune as they are ratified by
parties to the treaty, would aid tremendously m the battle to enforce
international environmental protection treaties.
48
Not surprisingly, at least one of the unofficial, non-binding state-
ments of the Stockholm conference, Principle Twenty-One, may now
have achieved the status of customary international law.49 Principle
42. P.H. Sand, International Cooperation: The Environmental Experience, in PRE-
sERvING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 236, 251 (J. Matthews ed., 1991).
43. U.N. Environment Programme: Report of the Governing Council, 42 U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 25, U.N. Doe. A/44/25 (1989).
44. See International Cooperation in the Monitoring, Assessment and Anticipation
of Environmental Threats and in Assistance in Cases of Environmental Emergency,
G.A. Res. 44/224, U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 44th Sess., Agenda Item 82(f), U.N. Doc.
A/44/49 (1990), 85th Plenary Session; Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and Its Im-
pact on the Living Marine Resouces of the World's Oceans and Seas, G.A. Res. 44/225,
U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 44th Sess., Agenda Item 82(f), U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1990),
85th Plenary Session; Traffic in and Disposal, Control and Transboundary Movements
of Toxic and Dangerous Products and Wastes, G.A. Res. 44/226, U.N. GAOR 2d
Comm., 44th Sess., Agenda Item 82(f), U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1990), 85th Plenary Ses-
sion; Implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 42/186 and 42187, G.A. Res.
44/227, U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 44th Sess., Agenda Item 82(f) (1990), 85th Plenary
Session; United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, G.A. Res. 44/
228, U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 44th Sess., Agenda Item 82(f), U.N. Doe. A/44/49
(1990), 85th Plenary Session.
45. Vienna Convention, supra note 35, Art. 38, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 at 341, 8 I.L.M.
at 689 (1969).
46. See W PAUL GoRmLEY, HUMAN RiH-rrs AND THE ENVIRONMENT. Tm
NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (1976).
47. U.N. Environment Programme, Register of International Treaties and Other
Agreements in the Field of the Environment, U.N. Doe. UNEP/GC/INFORMATION/
ll/Rev.1 (1985).
48. Id.
49. Environmental Perspective to the Year 2000 and Beyond, G.A. Res. 42/186,
U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 42nd Sess., Agenda Item 82(e), U.N. Doc. A/C.2/44/L.64
(1988); Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, G.A.
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Twenty One of the Stockholm Conference stipulates: [S]tates have, m
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles
of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction.
Traditional international law-making or standard setting is an inher-
ently slow process. This is due m large part to the lack of consensus
surrounding existing norms of international environmental law.50
What little international environmental law exists is often ineffective
because of the absence of enforcement mechanisms. International co-
operation in the area of enforcement is necessary in order to make the
formulation of any new laws and subsequent rights meanmgful. 51
Among other things, an international environmental lawmaking pro-
cess that can be enforced should:
(1) address uncertainty and the evolving nature of one's knowl-
edge by explicitly viewing such lawmaking as an ongoing process
within which knowledge is advanced and becomes shared through
the embedding of scientific, technical, environmental, and economic
expertise m the organizational regime;(2) encourage participation, yet avoid unrelated linkages, by ad-
dressing related interests of special groups of states and by denying
any benefit to those remaining outside the regime, and
(3) resolve the tension of manageability of negotiations and sys-
temic thinking by the identification of factual assumptions also
within the scope of inquiry of the experts' committees embedded
within the process.5 2
A. The Need for Multilateral Participation
It is a well settled principle of international law that sovereign states
may bind themselves through international agreements. The central
precept, pacta sunt servanda, demands that states obey commitments
in good faith. It is difficult for a nation to sign a treaty which, m ef-
fect, relinquishes some of its sovereign authority to some international
Res. 42/187, U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 42nd Sess., Agenda Item 82(e), U.N. Doc. A/
C.2/44/L.64 (1988); Implementation of the General Assembly Resolutions 42/186 and
42187, G.A. Res. 44/227, U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 44th Sess., Agenda Item 82(f), at 4(1989); United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, G.A. Res. 44/
228, U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 44th Sess., Agenda Item 82(f), U.N. Doc. A14417461
Add.7 (1990).
50. R.D. MUNRO & J.G. LAMMERS, WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT, EXPERTS GROUP ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS (1987).
51. Id.
52. David D. Caron, Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone Layer and the Structure
of International Lawmaking, in LAND USE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 681, 703 (1991).
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organization. Herein lies a major concern of international environ-
mental treaties. In recent years, especially following the fall of com-
munism and the rise of democracy in many states, the level of
international cooperation is perhaps at an all-time high. However, a
"umted" system of international states is by no means functional in
any type of governmental sense.53 It is, at best, anarchical with indi-
vidual states retaining sovereignty.
States often vigorously defend their sovereignty because they con-
sider their physical integrity and continued political identity as impor-
tant elements in their foreign policies.54 The problem of sovereignty is
a large hurdle to overcome. Although states must honor commit-
ments in good faith, they may also unilaterally withdraw from a re-
gime to which they were previously parties.55 The option to withdraw
undermines the purpose of any agreement; further, if the withdrawal
is clandestine, the situation may become a serious problem. To pre-
vent such defections, momtoring is required; without it, enforcement
is virtually impossible. Generally, agreements provide for some type
of verification. However, maintenance of the efficiency and integrity
of verification systems create yet another challenge. Since states are
sovereign and are free to choose as they will, they often rely on collec-
tive action to implement and momtor treaties. This further increases
the chances of unilateral withdrawal.
The employment of treaty law to environmental problems has many
obstacles: treaties are generally specific, narrowly tailored and very
linuted in usefulness until a large number of states ratify the treaty;
they lack enforcement mechanisms that would encourage compli-
ance 56 and speedy resolution of treaty disputes.5 7 Briefly, customary
law crystallizes as the resolutions of the General Assembly evolve into
declarations that evince a stronger commitment to a principle.58 State
practice then develops in applying the principles, along with opinio
juris, or the writings of legal scholars and jurists. In addition, certain
fundamental areas may be characterized as "general principles of
law," another traditional source of public international law.59
An additional hurdle to overcome is "international nepotism.
60
Some officials believe that the best solution is to have different orga-
nizations handle different international environmental problems ac-
53. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Addison-Wesley
Pub. Co. 1979).
54. Id.
55. S. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Interven-
ing Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (S. Krasner ed., 1983).
56. Tinker, supra note 17, at 805.
57 Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice: General Course in
Public International Law, in 178 R.C.A.D.I. 21, 110-32 (1982).
58. Tinker, supra note 17, at 805.
59. 1947 I.CJ. Acts & Docs. 37, 46 Art.38(1)(c), (Ser. D) No. 1.
60. JACOBSON & KAY, supra note 6.
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cording to each institution's expertise. However, this can result in
disorganization, incongruity, lack of precedent and inability to enforce
decisions as the global bureaucracy weigh verdicts with red tape and
politics.61 Furthermore, diversification does nothing to promote coop-
eration or coordination and everything to stifle it, since state officials
will naturally want the environmental problems with which they are
concerned to be treated by international orgamzations over which
they have the most influence. 62 Although some government officials
have clear ideas about how these environmental tasks should be delin-
eated, their views are not umversally accepted even within their own
governments. 63
Moreover, the conflict between economic growth and environmen-
tal protection must be addressed. Both are essential for survival in an
increasingly industrial world. The conflict is heightened in newly de-
veloping countries where political leaders are faced with constant
pressure to achieve economic prosperity, oftentimes at great cost to
the environment. It is difficult to persuade a nation not to destroy its
forests when the survival of families and people depends on that par-
ticular resource. Nevertheless, the solution to international environ-
mental problems must include developing countries if it is to be
successful. Thus, the international commumty must help the develop-
ing countries to pursue international environmental goals by provid-
ing pollution-reducing technologies and economic assistance toward
education.' 4 In the near future, established nations will be pressured
to sponsor responsible environmental programs and encourage the co-
operation of developing countries by providing them with economic
and technological assistance.
Several concerns must be addressed in drafting new international
environmental law. First, revelations from the scientific community
are continuously changing the scope of environmental concerns, mak-
ing it more difficult to identify the most pressing issues. Therefore,
environmental lawmaking must be conducted amidst great uncer-
tainty about the reality, cause, and extent of the problem; second,
because the nature of environmental problems, such as ozone de-
pletion, require concerted action, it is necessary that at least the ma-
jor contributors to the problem, present and future, be parties to the
regime; third, because it is difficult to separate environmental
problems from one another and from development concerns gener-
ally, environmental lawmaking runs the risk of either being unman-
ageable or not system oriented.6 5
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. A Cool Look at Hot Air, ECONOMIST, June 16, 1990, at 17.
65. Caron, supra note 52, at 699.
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Every problem associated with international environmental law af-
fects the issue of enforcement. Until problems and solutions are
clearly defined, implementation is effected on a global scale, and the
lawmaking process is globally representative, compliance and enforce-
ment will remain elusive goals and the environment will continue to
degenerate.
B. Enforcement of International Environmental Treaties
There is agrowing body of international environmental law that is
well-intentioned yet unenforced. It is important to create an enforce-
ment mechanism for this body of law, since without enforcement, the
law is but a shallow code riddled with dubious rationalizations. Most
multilateral agreements governing international environmental pro-
tection are merely morally binding. Therefore, the success of such
agreements is dependent upon the willingness of countries to abide by
the provisions and enforce compliance among their citizens.
66
This is unlikely as states continue to place great emphasis on sover-
eignty. The nature of the international legal system prevents it from
performing as adequately and effectively as national legal systems.
Currently, the United Nations' role in environmental management in-
cludes information gathering, monitormg, and rule-making; there is
very little enforcement activity. Debate over a larger role for the
Umted Nations in the future revolves around the necessity or desira-
bility of creating a new or centralized United Nations authority to un-
dertake environmental functions.67 Currently, there is no centralized
legislative or judicial body with mandatory jurisdiction and more im-
portantly, enforcement authority. The effectiveness of international
legal instruments, such as conventions and gidelines, depends almost
entirely on voluntary compliance. National governments for the most
part determine for themselves whether they are in compliance with
obligations under various international agreements that have yet to
become part of the sovereign body of laws. There is no institutional-
ized body to enforce compliance. When a particular obligation is con-
trary to a country's greater interests, it is unlikely that the obligation
will be met. It is becoming increasingly apparent that a neutral, in-
dependent organization should be established to encourage uniform
compliance among all nations through the use of education, financial
assistance and sanctions instead of providing enforcement merely at
the national level.6"
66. Michael S. Giauno, Deforestation in BraziL" Domestic Political Imperative -
Global Ecological Disaster, 18 ENVTL. L. 537 (1988).
67. The Hague Declaration on the Environment, March 11, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1308.
[hereinafter Hague Declaration].
68. Eshbach, supra note 14, at 302.
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One particularly effective means of cultivating enforcement is nega-
tive publicity.6 9 The same telecommunications technology that
brought the environmental problems to the political forefront can also
be used to enforce it effectively Public officials are particularly sensi-
tive to the pressures of adverse publicity.70 The general public is be-
coming more sensitive toward environmental problems and
governments seem to be responding to that sensitivity. As mentioned
earlier, NGOs can play an important role in maintaining public aware-
ness and exerting pressure on public officials.7 '
Many agreements remain unenforceable simply because violations
are ambiguous. Tis ambiguity is due to the vagueness of the obliga-
tion and because no clear mechanism exists for reprisal for even bla-
tant violations. Rather than relying on coercive means of
enforcement, states should place greater reliance on international
agencies, since "[tihese agencies can monitor treaty compliance and
mobilize the publicity and political pressure necessary to enhance
treaty enforcement. '72
International agencies are neither shackled by international politics
or influenced by political pressures, since, for the most part, they are
generally privately funded. In addition, "by fostering an environmen-
tal ethic within state bureaucracies, these agencies can encourage as-
sent to and implementation of international agreements."73 At
traditional international law, "right process"'7 4 - the perception of
which determines a rule's legitimacy - is simply the consent of each
affected state to be bound as expressed either in agreements or in
69. Negative publicity is also an effective means of spawning action m the corpo-
rate sector. For example, in April 1990, the publicity given towards the method of
tuna fishing in which dolphins were being suffocated to death prompted the chairman
of H.J. Heinz Company to announce that its subsidiary, Starkist, would sell only
dolphin-safe tuna as certified by independent observers. Immediately following this
announcement Van de Camp Seafood Company and Bumble Bee Seafoods, Inc.
adopted similar policies. Collaterally, the United States Congress responded by intro-
ducing legislation that would require tuna producers to print whether their tuna was
dolphin safe on the label. Congress also introduced legislation intended to reduce the
worldwide use of large scale driftnets in fishing. The environmental group, Earth Is-
land, produced a simple video news release that featured footage of the dolphin
slaughter aboard a commercial fishing boat to accomplish the objective. The increas-
ing cost of environmental disasters is another large factor influencing corporate pol-
icy. Incidents such as the Exxon-Valdez oil spill and the Sandoz Chemical accident
have had enormous financial repercussions on the corporations involved in addition
to all the negative publicity received. It is becoming apparent to these multinational
corporations that it is less expensive, financially, as well as politically, to prevent these
disasters rather than to try to explain them.
70. L.K. CALDWELL, BETWEEN Two WORLDs: SCIENCE, THE ENVIRONMENTAL
MOVEMENT AND POLICY CHOICE (Cambridge University Press 1990).
71. Id.
72. See Developments in the Law, supra note 23, at 1590.
73. Id.
74. Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L.
705, 711 (1988).
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long-standing practice. 75 For these reasons, Intergovernmental Orga-
nizations (IGOs) are ideally suited for the task in the absence of una-
nimity or supranational authority by establishing procedures for
adopting substantive standards m a way that raises the political costs
of nonconformity. 76 Although IGOs have successfully employed such
tactics for years, environmental IGOs have not fully exploited their
potential.77
Compliance of international agreements may also be used as an ob-
vious means of enforcement:
Compliance is often treated as if it were an objectively defined un-
problematic state, rather than a fluid, negotiable matter. Compli-
ance, however, is an elaborate concept, one better seen as a process,
rather than a condition. A strategy of compliance is a means of
sustaining the consent of the regulated where there is ambivalence
about the enforcement agency's mandate. Enforcement in a com-
pliance system is founded on reciprocity, for conformity is not snn-
ply a matter of the threat or the rare application of legal
punishment but rather a matter of bargaining.
1. Enforcement Mechanisms
Two multilateral documents have proposed international enforce-
ment mechanisms for protection of the international environment:
the first is the report of the legal experts group of the World Commis-
sion on the environment 9 This report contains a draft convention as
well as General Principles on Environmental Protection and Sustaina-
ble Development. 0 It proposes a well-developed organizational
structure, headed by a United Nations High Commissioner for the en-
vironment who would hear individual complaints and issue reports
and a Commission for the Environment that would hear complaints
from states and issue reports. 8' This report was not, however, consid-
ered during the debate on United Nations reform, probably because
the document has no binding force and was not issued by an official
United Nations organization.
The plan for a High Commissioner and a Commission empowered
to hear reports and complaints echoes the form successfully used by
the United Nations' commitment to human rights and refugee mat-
75. D.W BowErr, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTiTUTIONS 146 (F.A. Praeger
ed., 1963).
76. CLIVE ARCHER, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 144 (Paul Wilkinson ed.,
1983).
77. Chayes & Chayes, Adjustment and Compliance Processes in International Reg-
ulatory Regimes, in PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT THE CHALLENGE OF
SHARED LEADERSHIP 280, 308 (Jessica Tchman Mathews et al. eds., 1991).
78. Id.
79. MUNRO & LAMMERS, supra note 50.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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ters.m The plan deserves the same type of consideration as a means of
expressing the United Nation's resolve on environmental matters.
This structure would allow citizens concerned about environmental
protection to circumvent national governments that presently stall on
corrective measures.83 Currently, citizen suits concerning environ-
mental injuries and duties may not be brought since individual citizens
lack standing in the International Court of Justice.,,
The second multilateral document, the. Hague Declaration on the
Environment,"5 calls for a "new institutional authority" with decision-
making and enforcement authority to be created within the United
Nations system to combat global warming.8 6 Unfortunately, the Dec-
laration is not specific on the form that the "authority" should take,
nor does it propose any type of design. However, it is a step in the
right direction.
An additional proposal made by the former Soviet Union would be
to create "green troops" modeled after the successful peace-keeping
and peace-making efforts of the United Nations.87 It includes creating
and staffing "green cross" centers that would be responsible for the
collection and analysis of various environmental data. The staff would
consist of emergency environmental "troops" who would be able to
deploy to environmental disaster scenes, conduct inspections, verify
treaty compliance through on-site inspections, and assess damage. 8
2. Assent and Enforcement
Whether the reluctance is rooted in paranoia, fear of loss of com-
mercial profit, or general disdain for the international community,
many states refuse to assent to treaties. Herein lies the major chal-
lenge: to provide the international community with a vehicle for in-
ternational cooperation regarding environmental hazards that has the
teeth to be self-enforcing without coercion or the use of force on the
part of any one nation or group of nations. Of course, the "teeth"
need not always be contentious. For example, a sovereign state ap-
82. See Tinker, supra note 17 at 807 n.57 (citing THEODORE MERON, HuMAN
RIG=TS LAW-MAKING IN T=E UNITED NATIONS: A CRrrIQUE OF INSTRUMENTS AND
PROCESS 214-15, 271-91) (1986)).
83. Id. at 807 n.58 (citing Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? To-
ward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972); Christopher D.
Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Revisited- How Far Will Law and Morals Reach?
A Pluralistic Perspective, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1985)).
84. Id.
85. Hague Declaration, supra note 67, at 1309.
86. Id.
87 See Tinker, supra note 17, at 807 (citing Thomas M. Franck, Soviet Initiatives:
U.S. Responses - New Opportunities for Reviving the United Nations System, 83 Am. J.
INT'L L. 531 (1989)).
88. Id. Unfortunately, once again, tus provision was not accepted as a General
Assembly resolution; it was shelved by way of supplementary annexation to a resolu-
tion citing it as an area to explore.
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proached with a "sign tis, or else.. ." ultimatum is likely to take a
hostile, aggressive stance regardless of the contents of the treaty or
convention m the name of sovereign pride. However, a state ap-
proached with the possibility of reward for assent to a treaty is likely
to carefully consider what needs to be done. The problem is that envi-
ronmental treaties are one of the few types of treaties where there is
no instant tangible reward. Since most environmental problems are
not necessarily perceived as clear and present dangers, it is difficult to
convince any state to assent to a treaty that denies them commercial
gain, or some other right that appears to be inalienable to their sover-
eignty, without some sort of tangible immediate benefit.
In order to be effective, environmental regulation should not, and
cannot stop at state borders. Since pollution and nature know no
boundaries, a simple smattering of national regulations is fairly useless
and ineffective. A possible solution that would circumvent the prob-
lem of state sovereignty is the creation of cooperation agreements.
Such an agreement may require the parties to cooperate in the area of
environmental protection,89 "to study pollution and its effects on the
environment," 9 to exchange scientific and techmcal information, and
to participate in bilateral conferences and other forms of cooperation
upon which the parties may agree.91
This may seem at first glance to be an impotent and futile exercise;
however, states may be more likely to assent to this type of agreement
since no loss of sovereignty is involved and it creates positive public-
ity. Further, and more importantly, like all instances of international
law, as these agreements gain political legitimacy within the interna-
tional community, they will significantly affect the behavior of people
and governments. 92 Tins mechanism for creating international stan-
dards has been applied successfully in the area of international human
rights.
Cooperative agreements do have some shortcomings: the less sov-
ereignty a treaty sacrifices, the more likely it is to gain assent, but the
more likely the agreement will fail to accomplish significant environ-
mental goals. It is, however, a means to further inform the public and
thereby create pressure on governments to assent to more stringent
treaties, and, ultimately, make enforcement easier.
3. Liability
The lack of precedent and noteworthy decisions in the arena of in-
ternational environmental law has stymied the international liability
89. Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection, May 23,
1972, U.S. - U.S.S.R., art. 1, 23 U.S.T. 845, 847(a)(i).
90. Id. art. 2, at 847.
91. Id. art. 3, at 848.
92. Thomas Buergenthal, International Human Rights Laws and Institutions: Ac-
complishments and Prospects, 63 WASH. L. Rnv. 1, 18 (1988).
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system and left the principle of "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas"93
in a state of abstraction. The lack of case law deprives the principle of
sic utere of the specificity that applications to particular instances of
international environmental crises would arguably furnish it.94 The
lack of case law is not due to the state of abstraction of sic utere;
rather, it is due, in part, to the reluctance of states to relinquish partial
sovereignty that submission to binding third party adjudication would
entail.95
The restrictions to standing in international adjudicatory fora such
as the International Court of Justice do nothing to mitigate the prob-
lem. Only states may appear as parties before the International Court
of Justice.96 Until the requirements for standing are broadened, the
international fora will remain as empty chambers that bow to the
whims of sovereign states, at least in the environmental arena.
The lack of a centralized supranational regulatory authority is often
cited as the "crucial barrier to effective environmental protection and
management."'97 For this reason, a new "'global authority'... a legis-
lative body capable of establishing binding standards... and an en-
forcement authority with power to make conclusive determinations as
to compliance" was proposed by United Nations Secretary General U
Thant at the Stockholm Conference.98
It is difficult to imagine the Umted States Environmental Protection
Agency without any authority to set standards and enforce compli-
ance via injunction or permit revocation. It ought to be equally diffi-
cult to imagine an international agency without similar powers.
Unfortunately, the prospect of a supranational agency with such pow-
ers remains unlikely, since to most interested parties "environmental
management means centralized regulation enforced by fines, injunc-
tions, and even incarceration."99 Further, the effectiveness of interna-
tional adjudication would be significantly reduced if judgments could
not be enforced. 10°
There is case law where courts have declined to enjoin activity in a
foreign country even though the court had established jurisdiction
over the defendant. Injunctions are difficult to enforce abroad, partic-
ularly when the injunction pertains to land use. Therefore, the courts
usually limit their relief to monetary damages. Most judgments ren-
93. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1380 (6th ed., 1991) ("One should use his own
property in such a manner as not to injure that of another.").
94. Developments in the Law, supra note 23, at 1501.
95. T. O'RioRDAN, ENVIRONMENTALISM (2d ed. 1981).
96. 1947 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 34 at 1042.
97 See Developments in the Law, supra note 23, at 1590.
98. Id. at 1591 (citing 8 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE SECRETARIEs-GENERAL OF T E
UNrTD NATIONS 350 (A. Cordier & M. Harrelson eds., 1977)).
99. Developments in the Law, supra note 23, at 1591.
100. See Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956), cert
denied, 352 U.S. 871.
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dered in the Umted States, however, are easily enforced because
many polluters are either United States citizens, have assets in the
United States, or trade with the United States.10 1 The lack of prece-
dent regarding international environmental damages, particularly lia-
bility, remains yet another hurdle that must be overcome if
enforcement is to be realized.
4. One Success: A Possible Model
The 1974 Convention on the Protection of the Environment signed
by Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden does not focus on any
particular resource located within the boundaries of a particular coun-
try. °2 It is instead a general treaty that addresses the environment as
a whole. The objective of the convention was to protect and improve
the environment through cooperation to ensure that activities in one
state do not damage the environment of other states.10 3 A treaty pro-
vision creates a right of action against the state for anyone who is
affected by environmentally harmful activities in that state, 1°4 and re-
quires each contracting state to establish a special authority to safe-
guard general environmental interests against nuisances arising from
environmentally harmful activities.' 5 This convention can serve as a
model for future conventions and treaties that address environmental
concerns in an international dimension. An expanded version of this
treaty might offer a cause of action for all countries, regardless of
proximity to the offending state,'0 6 thereby allowing any state to pro-
test any activity that has been proven to be harmful to the common
environment; it would also eliminate the diplomatic, political, and
sometimes economic pressures that result against the protesting na-
tion. Developing countries would need express recognition of their
right to continue growing as one of the stipulations of such a treaty
and provisions for that purpose would need to be included in order to
gain their assention.
The Umted Nations attempted to reach a working compromise on
the same issue when the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2849
on December 20, 1971,107 which urged member states to strive to solve
environmental problems through international cooperation. 0
101. See Developments in the Law, supra note 23, at 1621.
102. Convention on Protection of the Environment, Feb. 19, 1974, partly reprinted
in UNEP/GC/Inf./11.
103. Id.
104. Id. art. 3.
105. Id. art. 14.
106. Id.
107. U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Development and Environment, G.A.
Res. 2849, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/2849 (1971). The United States
was opposed to this resolution.
108. Id.
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III. A PROPOSAL FOR A CENTRAL REGULATORY AuTHORITY
At minimum, there is a need for a central authority that coordinates
efforts and maintains a steady flow of information in regard to the
global environment as discussed earlier. A central authority ought to
be able to achieve the following:
1. Define and Identify Problems: This involves not only discover-
ing problems but also establishing that they are legitimate
problems. Data must be made available and established in the sci-
entific community as valid. The international community is con-
stantly becoming aware of new situations that are environmentally
hazardous that previously were not considered threatening. Any
system that will be efficient in identifying and discovering problems
must be a decentralized one; some degree of serendipitousness is
involved as some environmental problems are discovered m pursuit
of altogether different goals. On the other hand, a centralized body
must exist to legitimize the validity of an existing problem and to
centralize coordination of an appropriate response.
2. Monitor Situations and Evaluate them: This requires organized,
repetitious collection of standardized data. Secondly, the data must
be evaluated, analyzed and interpreted. Again, standard measuring
and evaluating techmques must be established in order to ensure
legitimacy.
3. Data and Information Collection: This task involves broader,
yet less rigid scheduled collection efforts as opposed to the igorous
exact monitoring of various scientific variables aforementioned. It
would include information of public concerns, on-going research re-
sults, physical phenomena gathered by using various statistical inter-
pretational tools, and most importantly the dissemination of
information collected, yet produced by other organizations.
4. Risk Estimation and Impact Estimation: Many activities in-
clude various degrees of risk to environmental safety. It is a diffi-
cult and complicated task to assign levels of risk to various activities
since value judgements would play a large role in this type of analy-
sis, therefore the legitimacy of this step is vital. However, officials
could conceive contingency tables with specific threshold require-
ments where corrective action would need to be applied.
5. Information Exchange and Dissemination: Nations remain the
vehicles of action; logic dictates that a freeflow of information con-
cernig environmental hazards be made available to all states. In-
formation in the form of raw statistics and data about various
physical phenomena should be disseminated as well as experiences
with application of policies regarding the hazard. Emulation of suc-
cessful policies and avoidance of mistakes is beneficial to the inter-
national community. Information exchange should be properly
focused in order to be effective. This is not to say that the mdustri-
alized countries need to divulge secret technology or relinquish pat-
ent rights.
6. Facilitation and Coordination of National and International
Programs: Generally, one state's policies will be more effective
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when implemented m conjunction with other states especially, but
not limited to various pollution policies. For instance, if one state
were to implement regulation in regard to deforestation and an-
other state were to simultaneously regulate the import of forested
raw materials, the chances of success are far greater. Obviously, the
greater the number of states participating, the greater the chance
for success. Various international organizations already provide the
framework for such collaboration; the key is to identify the proper
entities; those who gain from the cooperation and at the same time
can make a meaningful contribution.
7. Standard Setting and Rule Making: Legally binding conven-
tions and treaties are essential instruments of international action in
almost all fields and are certainly essential in the field of environ-
mental protection. 10 9
8. Compliance: In order for treaties or conventions to have an ef-
fect other than another photo opportunity for state dignitaries,
measures must be conceived to ensure compliance. Steps include
examination of state policies, gathering evidence to determine to
what extent, if any, a state is in compliance with a given treaty, vali-
dating the evidence, and deciding on appropriate action when they
are not in compliance. In general, there is no international organi-
zation vested with such power, nor is there likely to be one m the
near future. It is difficult to perceive any international organization
could physically force compliance of powerful states against their
will; even today there is little coercion used against less powerful
states. Treaties are the accepted vehicle for addressing international
solutions to problems; unfortunately, state sovereignty often pre-
cludes ratification of some treaties. Sovereignty is a stumbling
block that must be mastered before enforcement can be
acheved." 0
9. Direct Operational Activities: This function involves orgamza-
tions conducting activities by themselves rather than facilitating or
coordinating the conduct of activities by states. Facilitation and co-
ordination should be left to the central authority. International
states might do all or part of several of the functions listed above.
In addition, international organizations should provide technical
and financial assistance to states. Direct operational activities are
the most important functions in this scheme.'
11
Of course, elimination of all secondary or tertiary avenues of infor-
mation, as mentioned previously, would be senseless as they are ex-
tremely valuable safeguards. The management of the Earth certainly
requires autonomy of independent organizations. Free to follow their
109. See discussion supra part III.
110. See discussion supra part III.A.
111. The nine objectives are adapted from a lengthier discussion in KAY, ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION: AN INTERNATONAL DIMENSION 14-16 (Allanheld, Osmun
and Co. 1983).
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own research agendas, scientific bodies have long been at the fore-
front of the environmental movement." 2
Scientific data has enlightened the world about the destruction of
the ozone layer, the rate of global warming, the decimation of species,
the pollution of rivers and seas, and the nature of toxic or hazardous
substances. The system must continue to encourage free, creative
thinking in order to identify problems and to solve already existing
ones; if the system becomes too rigid or bureaucratized, there must be
an autonomous multitude of independently organized factions pre-
pared to shred through the red tape and implement action.
This will require vast amounts of coordination and cooperation, but
it would serve two purposes: one, it would serve as a backup system
in cases of urgency; and two, it provides a system of checks and bal-
ances on the central authority in the event of overzealous leadership.
Independent organizations already exist, (International Law Associa-
tion (ILA), the International Union for Conservation of Nature and
Natural Resources (IUCN), the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF),
the World Meterological Organization (WMO), Greenpeace, etc., all
of which are Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)), therefore
funding, independence, and authority are already established. The
key to the backup system for a central authority is the autonomy of
these groups and agencies; they must be able to act under their own
authority, as they do now, without answering to any specific
government.
CONCLUSION
To be handled successfully, international matters concerning the
protection and improvement of the environment must be handled in a
cooperative manner by all nations. The relative wealth, might, or size
of a particular state is irrelevant in the environmental arena as even
the smallest, poorest and weakest nation may wreak environmental
disasters on huge regions of the world.
Cooperation that takes due account of the sovereignty interests of
all states is essential to the effective control, prevention, reduction,
and elimination of diverse environmental effects that are the result of
activities in all spheres." 3
Any real authority conducting environmental planet management
must exercise strong leadership that is responsive to the needs of all
people for a healthy environment and must balance competing inter-
ests in distributing the Earth's limited resources in a fair and equitable
manner." 4 It follows that if power is given to such an authority, states
112. Tinker, supra note 17, at 820.
113. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf/48/14 and Corr. 1 (1972).
114. Tinker, supra note 17, at 817.
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will have to accept limitations on sovereignty,115 yielding real deci-
sion-making power to this new institutional body. If we are to truly
preserve the Earth for future generations we must be careful to in-
clude all interests into a unified body. It must include the opinions of
the independent sector, sovereign states, non governmental orgamza-
tions, intergovernmental organizations and the full coordination of
both the public and private sector.
The decision-making process must be representative of the global
community if it is to ascend to legitimacy and generate the power to
enforce treaties and decisions. Complete management of Earth re-
quires global planning and cooperation if it is to succeed. The task
ahead requires creating a healthy, clean, and safe worldwide environ-
ment without sacrificing economic growth.
Although the task seems daunting at the very least, imagine the
consequences of stagnation. It is possible to achieve the objective
through sound management intertwined with cooperation and coordi-
nation. It is not an easy task to create an enforcement authority as the
politics of sovereignty and the economics of survival lay ahead.
The environmental challenges on the horizon require umque legal
solutions; it is one of the few times that the developed world needs the
cooperation and participation of the third world. The ultimate goal,
however, must remain the development and strengthening of each
state's own regulatory regime." 6 States must be committed to inter-
national cooperation through economic and technological resources to
achieve mastery over the problems that threaten the Earth. Various
reforms are necessary, but none, standing alone, will be adequate to
face the environmental demands ahead.
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